ABSTRACT Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) is to compute privately the cardinality of the intersection of two sets, and there are many practical applications of PSI-CA, e.g., data mining and data analysis with the privacy protection. The current classical protocols for PSI-CA could not resist the attacks of quantum computers. In this paper, we present a novel quantum protocol for PSI-CA based on the basic laws of quantum mechanics, which can resist well-known quantum attacks. This protocol utilizes single photons as quantum resources and only needs to apply simple single-photon operators and measurements. Therefore, it is more feasible to implement this protocol, compared with the related quantum protocols, which require entangled states and other complicated operators.
unconditionally secure two-party computations will be not possible in both classical settings and quantum settings. Of course, later research results further show that quantum protocols of two-party computing problems (though not information theoretically secure) can provide a higher security than the corresponding classical protocols, e.g., quantum bit commitment [18] and quantum coin tossing [19] . Since there was no information theoretically secure two-party computation, later many researchers presented some practically secure quantum protocols for specific secure two-party computations, e.g., cheat-sensitive quantum private query protocols [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . In addition, there also appeared quantum privacy comparison protocols with the assistance of a third party [31] [32] [33] [34] .
Recently, we sought quantum approach to solve the PSI-CA problem and presented two probabilistic two-party quantum protocols for PSI-CA [1] , [35] , which could output a good estimator of the intersection cardinality with small error at high probability. Compared with the corresponding classical protocols, our previously proposed quantum PSI-CA protocols has two good advantages: the higher security and the lower communication complexity, where the communication complexity of the first quantum PSI-CA protocol [1] is O(1) and the second quantum PSI-CA protocol [2] is O(m). Here m is a small integer and m N . However, the two protocols only give theoretical approaches to approximatively solve the problem of PSI-CA, because both two protocols utilize quantum counting algorithm, which requires multi-particle entangled states as quantum resources and needs some complicated oracle operators and measurements in high dimensional Hilbert space. As we know, nowadays it is difficult to prepare these resources and implement these quantum operators with the present technologies.
In this paper, we present a practical and feasible quantum PSI-CA protocol with single photons, which can privately compute the intersection cardinality.
II. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Here, we first review the definition of Private Set Intersection Cardinality in Refs. [35] , [36] .
Definition 1: Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) -Initially, Alice has a private set A and Bob has another private set B. After executing a PSI-CA protocol, both Alice and Bob output the intersection cardinality of two sets A and B, i.e., |A ∩ B|. Furthermore, a perfect PSI-CA protocol should meet the following properties:
Alice's Privacy: Bob has no private information about Alice's set A except knowing |A ∩ B|.
Bob's Privacy: Alice learns no private information about Bob's set B except knowing |A ∩ B|.
Fairness: Alice and Bob are two peer entities, and no one can successfully cheat the other to get any private information of the other. Finally, Alice and Bob output the result of |A∩B| with equal opportunities.
However, perfect secure two-party computations, including perfect PSI-CA defined above, cannot be implemented in theory by the no-go results from [22] [23] [24] . Therefore, similarly we introduce a third party to help Alice and Bob to compute the intersection cardinality of their private sets, and then present a novel quantum PSI-CA protocol with the help of a third party (TP), where the TP could be dishonest but never collude with any party. Based on the assumption that TP is non-colluding, no one can get any private information of the other.
In the following protocol, there are three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, where Alice has a private set A, Bob has a private set B, and Charlie is the non-colluding third party (later abbreviated as TP). Without loss of generality, we assume that all elements of two sets A and B belong to Z N , where Z N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1} and N = 2 n . The proposed protocol consists of 14 steps, which is described as follow:
Step 1: Alice and Bob respectively encode their private sets A and B into the corresponding private vectors (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x N −1 ) and (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N −1 ) over F N 2 by the following methods:
Alice generates the private vector (x 0 , x 1 , . . . ,
by her private set A, where each element of the set determines one component of the vector, i.e., for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, x i = 1 if i ∈ A and x i = 0 otherwise. Similarly, Bob generates the private vector (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N −1 ) ∈ F N 2 by his private set B, i.e., for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, y i = 1 if i ∈ B and y i = 0 otherwise.
Step 2: By running BB84 QKD protocol [18] , Alice and Bob share a private key K , whose bit length is N logN .
Step 3: Furthermore, Alice and Bob share a secure permutation as follows: x Alice (or Bob) randomly gener-
, where Step 4: Alice and Bob apply the permutation P to their private vectors (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x N −1 ) and (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N −1 ), and further get (x * 0 , x * 1 , . . . , x * N −1 ) and (y * 0 , y * 1 , . . . , y * N −1 ), respectively, i.e.,
Step 5: Charlie prepares N groups of single photon sequences, where each group of single photon sequences includes m photons (later called signal photons), which are in a same state chosen randomly from the four states, { 0 , 1 , + , − },
Here θ ∈ (0, π 4 ). Later we will discuss that it is best to select θ = Step 6: For each group of single photon sequences, Charlie again prepares m * (m * ≤ m) additional photons (later called puppet photons) to avoid the attacks by the participant (e.g., Bob), which are randomly in one of four states, {| 0 , | 1 , | + , | − }. Furthermore, Charlie randomly inserts these puppet photons into each group of single photon sequences, e.g.,
j represents the puppet photon, and makes a record of the inserted positions of these puppet photons. Accordingly, S * denotes the sequence of all (m + m * )N photons, including mN signal photons and m * N puppet photons.
Step 7: Charlie prepares q decoy photons to check whether there is an eavesdropper when transmitting the photon sequence. Each decoy photon is selected randomly from four states {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. Furthermore, Charlie randomly inserts the q decoy photons into the sequence S * to form a new sequence S * C , and makes a record of the details about positions and states of these insertion photons. Of course, no one knows the initial states and the insertion positions of all decoy photons except Charlie. Finally, the new sequence S * C is sent to Alice through the quantum channel, i.e., Charlie sends all photons (including signal photons, puppet photons and decoy photons) of the new sequence S * C to Alice in order.
Step 8: After Alice has successfully received the photon sequence S * C , she requests Charlie to open the insertion positions of all q decoy photons in the sequence S * C and their corresponding measurement bases. Then Alice measures all decoy photons in the correct bases and announces the corresponding measurement results. After that, Charlie compares the initial states of all decoy photons with the corresponding measurement results of Alice. If the error rate is higher than a threshold value, which is determined beforehand by the channel noise, this protocol will be aborted. Otherwise, it will continue the next step.
Step 9: Alice discards all decoy photons from the sequence S * C and further gets the sequence S * , which includes N groups of single photon sequences, and each group has (m + m * ) single photons. For each group of single photon sequences
. . , N , Alice applies a same unitary operator to each signal photon and each puppet photon, i.e., each s i j (j = 1, 2, . . . , m) and each
, as the following strategies: If x * i−1 = 0, then Alice will apply a local unitary operator I to each photon s i j (s * i j ), i.e., she will do nothing; If x * i−1 = 1 and K (i) = 0 (Note: K (i) denotes the ith bit of the secret key K ), then Alice will apply a local unitary operator σ x to each photon s i j (s * i j ); If x * i−1 = 1 and K (i) = 1, then Alice will apply a local unitary operator σ z to each photon s i j (s * i j ).
Step 10: Furthermore, Alice generates q decoy photons to prevent eavesdropping, where the state of each decoy photon is randomly selected from four states {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. Similarly, Alice inserts randomly q decoy photons into the sequence S * to form a new sequence, called S * A , and records the detailed positions and states of all insertion photons. Finally, Alice sends all photons of the new sequence S * A to Bob in order through the quantum channel.
Step 11: Similarly, after Bob successfully receives the sequence S * A , he requests Alice to open the insertion positions of all q decoy photons in the sequence S * A and the corresponding measurement bases. Then Bob measures these decoy photons based on the correct bases and announces the measurement results. After that, Alice compares the initial states of all decoy photons with their corresponding measurement results. If the error rate is higher than the threshold value, this protocol will be aborted. Otherwise, it will continue the next step.
Step 12: Bob discards all decoy photons from the sequence S * A and further obtains the sequence S * , which includes (m + m * ) N single photons evenly distributed in N groups of single photon sequences. For each group of single photon sequences Step 13: Similarly, Bob inserts randomly q decoy photons, which are selected randomly from four states {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }, into the sequence S * and gets the new sequence S * B . Then, Bob sends all single photons of the sequence S * B back to Charlie in order through the quantum channel. Furthermore, Charlie and Bob jointly check the states of all decoy photons to ensure the security of the quantum channel. The detailed checking procedures please refer to Step 7 or Step 10. After confirming the security of the quantum channel, Charlie discards all decoy photons and all puppet photons from the returned sequence S * B and further gets the initial signal photon sequence S, which only includes mN signal photons evenly distributed among VOLUME 7, 2019 
III. ANALYSIS A. CORRECTNESS
By the encoding rules in Step 1, for any i ∈ Z N , if i ∈ A and i ∈ B, then x i = 1 and y i = 1. So the cardinality of the intersection of the sets A and B is equal to the number of i ∈ N satisfying both x i = 1 and y i = 1, i.e., |A ∩ B| =
That is, the cardinality of the intersection of the sets A and B is just equal to the number of i ∈ N satisfying both x * i = 1 and y * i = 1. Furthermore, due to N components of the private vectors (x * 0 , x * 1 , . . . , x * N −1 ) and (y * 0 , y * 1 , . . . , y * N −1 ), Charlie prepares N groups of single photon sequences to count the number of i ∈ N satisfying both x * i = 1 and y * i = 1, where each group of single photon sequences includes m signal photons (except the puppet photons), which are used to decide whether it satisfies the property of both x * i = 1 and y * i = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that all m signal photons (i.e., s Table 1 . For example, if x * i = 1, then Alice will perform the unitary operator σ x on each signal photon of this group. So the state of each signal photon will be transformed into the state, sinθ |0 + cosθ |1 . Furthermore, if y * i = 1, then Bob will perform the unitary operator σ z on each signal photon of this group, such that the state of each signal photon will be in sinθ |0 − cosθ |1 . Accordingly, the final measurement result of each signal photon in this group must be 1 , i.e., it is orthogonal to its initial state, 0 . Therefore, t = t + 1. In addition, for other 3 cases (i.e., the first three rows in Table 1 ), the probabilities of Charlie's finally getting the state 0 are 1, (cosθ 2 − sinθ 2 ) 2 and 4cosθ 2 sinθ 2 , respectively. Obviously, for the first case, Charlie's measurement result is the same as its initial state with the 100% probability, so Charlie only needs to perform one measurement on any signal photon in this group and the value of the counter t does not need to make any changes. For the latter two cases, by the Figure 1 , we can easily see that that it is best to select θ = . Obviously, if x * i = 1 and y * i = 1, all measurement results of m signal photons in this group will be fully different from their initial states. However, if x * i = 0 or y * i = 0, Charlie will find that at least one measurement result in this group is the same as the initial state at a very high probability of at least 1 − 1 2 m . That is, the probability of any one error (i.e., ''x * i = 0 or y * i = 0'' is wrongly judged to be ''x * i = 1 and probability is
Here t is the output result, which includes r errors, i.e.,
|A ∩ B| should be t − r.
For the different values of r, t and m, we list the corresponding probability of p(t, r, m) in Table 2 . From Table 2 , we can see that the error probability is very small, and negligible if m ≥ 10. Furthermore, in Eq. (10), let m = log t, then we will get p(t, r, m) = C r t · 2 −rm =
t(t−1)(t−2)...(t−r) r! · 2 −rm = t(t−1)(t−2)...(t−r) r!t r
. If r = 2 and t = 20, p (t, r, m) = 
t(t−1)(t−3)(t−4)
24t 4 = 0.0303. So we can let m = log t to get negligible error. Please note that t ≤ N , i.e., m ≤ log N . In practice, we may let m = log N to overcome the loss of the photons disturbed by environment.
In conclusion, that each group of single photon sequences includes m signal photons guarantees the correctness of our protocol. In addition, Charlie can similarly count the number of i ∈ N satisfying both x * i = 0 and y * i = 0, i.e., he can also output |A ∪ B| besides |A ∩ B|.
B. SECURITY
Our PSI-CA protocol is executed with the help of a TP, where the TP could be dishonest but never collude with any party [36] . Firstly, we discuss the TP's attacks (i.e., a dishonest Charlie's attacks).
For a dishonest or malicious Charlie, to get the partial private information of Alice or Bob, he may initially prepare some entangled photon pairs (e.g., EPR pairs) instead of the corresponding single photons, where one photon in each entangled photon pair is kept in his hand and the other photon is sent to Alice or Bob. After Alice or Bob performs the private operator (i.e., I , σ x or σ z ) on the transmitted photon, Charlie wants to know which operator Alice or Bob has performed by measuring the corresponding photon kept in his hand. However, the reduced density matrix of the subsystem held by Charlie is unchanged both before and after Alice or Bob's performing her or his operator. For example, if the state of the entangled photon pairs initially prepared by Charlie is in
|10 , where the first photon is kept by Charlie and the second photon is transmitted to the parties, then the reduced density matrix of the first photon kept by Charlie is always 1 3 |0 0| + 2 3 |1 1|, no matter before or after the parties' performing the unitary operators. That is, the reduced density matrix of the subsystem kept by Charlie is independent of Alice or Bob's private operator. Therefore, only from his partial qubits in hands, Charlie cannot extract any private information of Alice or Bob, even if he prepares the entangled quantum resources instead of single photons resources.
Furthermore, if Charlie is dishonest, he may intercept all transmitted photons of the sequence S * A from Alice to Bob, including signal photons, puppet photons and decoy photons, in order to get partial information about Alice's private operators (I , σ x or σ z ), which are related to Alice's private vector (x * i = 0 or x * i = 1). To avoid being found, he may only select out a certain photon from each group and replace it with a fake photon. Furthermore, we assume that Charlie can successfully guess the selected photon is not one of the decoy photons and he can fully know its initial state, so Charlie may utilize optimal Unambiguous State Discrimination (USD) measurement [37] , [38] . The USD will correctly tell Charlie which one of the two probable states the selected photon is actually in. The successful probability of USD is shown below,
where F(ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) is the fidelity between the two quantum states which Charlie seeks to discriminate. Suppose that the initial state sent by Charlie is in 0 = cosθ |0 +sinθ |1 , and the returned state sent by Alice is in 0 = sinθ |0 +cosθ |1 (i.e., x * i = 1), the successful probability of USD is p USD . p
That is, Charlie can successfully deduce x * i = 0 or x * i = 1 at the probability of 0.29, by performing an optimal Unambiguous State Discrimination measurement on the selected photon. However, Charlie still cannot know the value of any x i without the permutation P, since (x 0 , x 1 , . . . ,
, where P is generated randomly and encrypted by the key K based on one-time pad, and the key K is distributed between Alice and Bob by using the QKD protocol. Furthermore, Charlie cannot rightly determine whether i belongs to Alice's private set A without the knowledge of x i , which is related to an element of the private set A.
In fact, even if Charlie directly measures all transmitted photons from Alice to Bob (this malicious attack will be easily detected by Alice and Bob later) and we assume that he can successfully obtain Alice's private vector
yet he cannot get the original vector (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x N −1 ) without the permutation P, where the security of P is guaranteed by the key K based on Quantum Key Distribution. Clearly, the permutation P is perfect secure. Similarly, Charlie can yet not get Bob's original vector (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N −1 ) due to the privacy of the permutation, P. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the attacks performed by a dishonest or malicious Charlie.
Secondly, we consider Alice's or Bob's attack. Suppose that Bob is dishonest and he wants to get Alice's private input. So, after he discards all decoy photons from the sequence S * A in Step 11 and further recovers the sequence S * , which carries Alice's private information, Bob does not honestly execute the required procedures, but tries to learn Alice's private vector x * 0 , x * 1 , . . . , x * N −1 by measuring all photons group by group, and later sends some fake photons to Charlie. For simplicity, we only analyze a group of single photon sequences, e.g.,
m } sent by Alice, which has hidden the value of x * i . Furthermore, we assume that the states of the signal photons in
} are in 0 = cosθ |0 + sinθ |1 prepared initially by Charlie and the states of other puppet photons are randomly in {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }.
Obviously, if we do not consider the puppet photons, we will get the following two cases:
On the one hand, if x * i = 0, Alice does not change the states of all signal photons. So Bob can rightly decipher x * i by measuring all signal photons in the correct base of { 0 , 1 }, and yet he does not know the correct measurement base. That is, Bob has a chance to know x * i = 0 with the probability of 1 
.
On the other hand, if x * i = 1, Alice will perform the operator σ x or σ z on each signal photon, and accordingly the state of the signal photon will be changed into 0 = sinθ |0 +cosθ |1 or 1 = cosθ |0 −sinθ |1 . Furthermore, if Bob selects the correct base of { 0 , 1 } to measure all signal photons, then he will find the states of all signal photons are not in a same state and further he can rightly deduce x * i = 1. However, Bob does not know the correct measurement base. So, Bob also has a chance to know x * i = 1 with the same probability of 1 2 . Therefore, if Bob can discriminate the signal photons and the puppet photons, he will have a 50% chance to get the value of x * i by the above analysis. However, all puppet photons are randomly inserted into the sequence of all signal photons, and the states of all puppet and signal photons are unknown to Bob. Furthermore, the state of any puppet photon and that of each signal photon are non-orthogonal. As we know, nonorthogonal states are indistinguishable by the basic laws of quantum mechanics. Therefore, this attack performed by Bob is infeasible.
In addition, in order to improve the security, θ can be secretly and dynamically selected by Charlie group by group, where θ ∈ (0, π 4 ) in the initial states 0 = cosθ |0 +sinθ |1 and 1 = sinθ |0 − cosθ |1 . If so, Bob cannot know the initial states of the signal photons, and accordingly he cannot select the correct measurement base. Of course, he cannot extract out the private information encoded by Alice on the signal photons.
Finally, we consider the outsider's attacks. However, the outsider does not know the detailed positions and the corresponding measurement bases of all decoy photons, so some well-known attacks, e.g., the intercept-and-resend attack, the entangle-and-measure attack and the measure-and-resend attack, will be easily found by the checking procedures of the decoy photons. Due to the limited space, here we only consider the entangle-and-measure attack performed by an outsider. Furthermore, since the decoy photons are utilized to check the eavesdropper, we mainly analyze the effects of the entangle-and-measure attack on a decoy photon in the state |ψ d , where |ψ d ∈ R {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. After receiving the decoy photon, the outsider generates an ancillary photon in the state of |0 a and applies an oracle operator U f to the decoy state |ψ d and the ancillary state |0 a , where the oracle operator U f is defined by [39] ,
Clearly, we can get,
That is, U + f U f = I , which satisfies the unitarity. If the state of the decoy photon is in |0 or |1 , it will get,
If the state of the decoy photon is in
On the one hand, by Eq.(16), we can easily see that if the state of the decoy photon is in |0 or |1 , the outsider will be able to determine whether it is in |0 or |1 without being detected by measuring the ancillary state. On the other hand, by Eq. (17) , if the state of the decoy photon is in
, the outsider will be detected with a 50% chance, whether or not he measures the ancillary state. Furthermore, the total number of decoy photons is q, where q is a secure parameter determined by the secure requirements. Therefore, it is infeasible for an outsider to perform this attack.
In fact, for an outsider, the action to steal Alice's or Bob's private information is equivalent to discriminate the operators she or he performed on the single photons, including the signal photons and the puppet photons, because Alice's or Bob's operators are fully determined by their private vectors and key. If the initial states of these photons are public, it will be easy for the outsider to discriminate these operators. However, the initial states are unknown to all except Charlie, which are privately and randomly selected by Charlie from { 0 , 1 , + , − } (i.e., signal photons) and {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } (i.e., puppet photons). Obviously, the states of all photons are not perfectly orthogonal in pairs. Based on the basic laws of quantum mechanics, non-orthogonal states are indistinguishable, which is similar to the BB84 QKD protocol. Therefore, the outsider's attack is infeasible in our protocol.
IV. PERFORMANCE
In proposed quantum PSI-CA protocol, we take single photons (including the signal photons, the puppet photons and the decoy photons) as quantum resources, apply single-photon operators, I , σ x or σ z , and perform singlephoton projective measurements. The puppet photons and the decoy photons are in polarized single-photon states, i.e., |0 , |1 , |+ and |− . The signal photons are in pure single-photon states, i.e., 0 , 1 , + and − , which are prepared by the rotation operators from four polarized single-photon states {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. Obviously, it is more feasible to prepare these resources and implement these operators and measurements, compared with the related quantum protocols required entangled states and other complicated operators and measurements.
Furthermore, we analyze and compare quantum resources, operators and measurements required in different quantum PSI-CA protocols, including our recently proposed two protocols [1] , [35] . The detailed performance evaluation and comparison are listed in Table 3 . From Table 3 , we can see that both computation and communication complexities of our new PSI-CA protocol are O(N logN ) (i.e., let m = logN ), which are independent of the size of sets (|A| and |B|), and thus our new PSI-CA protocol should be more suitable for larger size sets.
Especially, compared with our recently proposed protocols [1] , [35] , our new protocol has the following merits. First, it only needs to take single photons as quantum resources and to apply single-photon operators and measurements, instead of multi-photon entangled states and complicated oracle operators and measurements in high N -or M -dimensional Hilbert space, hence it is more feasible with the current technologies than those proposed with entangled states. Second, the new protocol does not have a failure rate compared with the existing protocols. Third, the new protocol can tolerant the partial loss of transmitted photons, because there are about logN (i.e., m) signal photons each group to only encode one bit classical information. i.e., the new protocol is more robust. In addition, we can easily use the fault tolerant technologies due to single photons, such as decoherence-free states and error-correcting code, in order to ensure its security in practical environments. Therefore, our new quantum protocol for PSI-CA is more practical and feasible compared with the existing protocols.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to privately compute the cardinality of the intersection of two sets, we presented a novel quantum PSI-CA protocol with the help of a non-colluding TP, who can ensure the fairness of the protocol. The security of this protocol is based on the basic laws of quantum mechanics. Especially, it takes good advantage of the probability features of quantum measurements, so that it can resist all kinds of well-known quantum attacks. Furthermore, this protocol takes single photons as quantum resources, and only needs to apply single-photon operators and measurements. With the present technology, it is more feasible to prepare these quantum resources and perform these quantum operators and measurements. In addition, this protocol still has the merits of zero failure and loss-tolerance. Therefore, we think that this protocol has very good prospects for practical applications in privacy-preserving and information-sharing settings.
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